Close Menu
  • Home
  • About
  • Africa
  • Americas
  • Asia
  • Europe
  • Middle East
  • Russia
  • South Asia
  • Space
  • World
  • Newsletters
  • Podcast
  • Contributors
  • Write For Us
  • Contact Us
Facebook X (Twitter) YouTube
  • Leaders
  • States
  • Networks
  • Ideologies
  • Technologies
  • Books
  • Podcast
Facebook X (Twitter) YouTube
Globely NewsGlobely News
  • Africa
  • Americas
  • Asia
  • Europe
  • Middle East
  • Russia
  • South Asia
  • Space
  • World
Subscribe
Trending
  • Indonesia’s 2024 Presidential Election Will Be a Three-Way Race
  • Will COP28 Host UAE Walk the Walk on Climate Change?
  • What Zambia Needs to Do to Resolve Its Debt Crisis
  • Tesla Needs Cybertruck Success to Uphold Market Dominance
  • Indonesia’s Nickel Policy Needs a Rethink
  • The Far Right Gains From Mainstream Media Hype
  • Geert Wilders’ Dutch Election Win Part of Far-Right Wave Challenging EU
  • New Sikh Separatist Murder Plot Could Force U.S. Rethink on India
Globely NewsGlobely News
Home » Branding the Belt and Road: Beijing Embarks on Damage Control in Central Asia
Asia

Branding the Belt and Road: Beijing Embarks on Damage Control in Central Asia

Yau Tsz Yan, EurasianetBy Yau Tsz Yan, EurasianetJanuary 20, 2020
Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Reddit WhatsApp
Follow Us
Google News Flipboard Facebook X (Twitter) YouTube
Kyrgyz President Jeenbekov
President of the Kyrgyz Republic Sooronbay Jeenbekov at the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting on May 15, 2018. (Image Credit: Press Service of the President of Russia)
Share
Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Reddit WhatsApp

Last summer, Zijin Mining Group, a Chinese state-owned minerals giant, erected a billboard on the highway from Bishkek to Lake Issyk-Kul, one of the most heavily travelled roads in Kyrgyzstan. The sign promoted Zijin’s Taldybulak Levoberezhny gold mine, claiming it was part of Beijing’s continent-spanning, era-defining Belt and Road Initiative. 

Except neither Zijin nor its gold mines are part of the BRI as far as China is concerned. A few months later, the billboard was gone and Zijin’s website had been scrubbed of BRI keywords.

Beijing is cracking down. Though its officially stated concerns have varied from case to case, the general effort seems to be geared at keeping the name of the government’s signature project as clean as possible.

Since Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced the BRI in 2013 – initially as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, and then combined into the One Belt, One Road initiative, as it is still known in Chinese – the project has become ubiquitous, but not universally welcomed by any means. An immense network of global interconnectivity, from transportation infrastructure to communications lines, it is China’s preeminent strategic development plan, an effort to redraft the rules of international trade and information technologies. Under Xi’s guidance, Beijing is underwriting projects ranging from highways to deep-sea ports to mass-surveillance technology around the world. With a budget estimated as high as $900 billion, according to one source, Beijing is subcontracting work not only to state-run companies but private ones, too, often with generous financing. 

The term BRI is used globally to describe China’s ambitions and open wallet. But there is no clear definition of what makes a BRI project and this has led to consternation on Beijing’s part. In 2015, the State Information Center, a Chinese government think tank, began adding the BRI label to particular projects. In 2017, the government, for the first time, warned businesses against misappropriating the BRI label to “accumulate wealth” through “clever” schemes. 

Complicating the state’s bid for clarity, it is private companies that lead BRI efforts. Of the BRI-related projects surveyed in a 2018 Chinese government report – and thus given the imprimatur of officialdom – 80.6 percent were carried out by private firms. (Official sources speak of “BRI member” states, but that means little other than that a country hosts a BRI project. The official list includes 137 countries and 30 international organizations.) 

As confusion reigns, private companies, both Chinese and foreign, leverage the catchall phrase – whether to claim bragging rights or perpetrate outright scams: “One Belt One Road camel milk” produced with “German technology” in Kazakhstan; a Ponzi scheme appealing to Chinese tourists in Malaysia, disguised as part of the BRI; that Kyrgyz gold mine. Nowadays, for every project lumped into the BRI – just because it’s financed by a Chinese bank, or a Chinese contractor is providing the laborers, or a hack thought it sounds good – there must be a thousand confused people wondering what, exactly, is the Belt and Road Initiative.

By the time Zijin’s billboard briefly appeared in Kyrgyzstan, Beijing had had enough. Over the summer authorities fined Youlian Wanjia Technology Group, a Beijing-based venture capital firm, for describing itself as part of the BRI, among other misleading claims. “It is easy for the [company’s] audience to think that the company is powerful or has some connection with the People’s government and the military,” reads the ruling, which marked the first such sanction. 

Drowning in Soft Power 

Apart from tarnishing the BRI name, some attempts at BRI freeloading risk compromising China’s broader soft-power capabilities in Central Asia as well. To combat the ill effects, Beijing now publishes a blacklist, flagging organizations deemed unscrupulous. Again, it is in part the BRI’s magnitude and China’s immense wealth that make the narrative so hard to control. 

In Bishkek, for example, Dolon TV, which has close to 100 employees in the city, offers Kyrgyz subscribers a package of some 80 channels, mostly Chinese, often dubbed into Russian. The station does not widely advertise that it is owned by Zhang Sulan, a Chinese national from Zhejiang. Shortly after President Xi announced the BRI, Dolon TV began partnering with China Central Television’s (CCTV) Silk Road TV Alliance to broadcast light documentary fare on the history of trade in the region. 

But dozens of analogous associations have sprung up in countries neighboring China, some of them with ties to official branches of the Chinese government, some without. There is the International Coalition for Green Development on the Belt and Road, the Alliance of International Science Organizations in the Belt and Road Region, and the Belt and Road Forum for Deans of Environmental Schools. Beijing’s blacklist includes, for example, the Belt and Road Arts Education Alliance and the One Belt One Road Nations Security Council.

Central Asians often hear about the BRI through such groups and local institutions are keen to join: The Kyrgyz State Medical Academy is one of 43 founding members of the Belt and Road International Medical Education Alliance; the Tajik Academy of Sciences is part of the Belt and Road University Strategic Alliance; Kazakhfilm, Kazakhstan’s state-backed film producer, is one of the 31 founding members of the Belt and Road Film Festival Alliance; two Uzbek museums are members of the Silk Road International Museum Friendship Alliance. 

For Beijing, this works fine until someone using the BRI name damages its reputation. 

Global Ambitions vs. National Policy

In some cases, the allure of the BRI seems to collide directly with China’s national policies, posing a thorny but classic challenge of globalization.

Last summer, for example, the Central Asia International Digital Asset Exchange – which advertises itself as part of the BRI, but officially is not – opened in Bishkek. It offers a platform for investors in China to finance projects in the region using a cryptocurrency established by the center: the Central Asian dollar. 

The Chinese government vocally disapproves of cryptocurrencies and has had over 170 banned in Chinese cyberspace. Yet it cannot control the Central Asian dollar, a Chinese manager at the exchange explained to Eurasianet: “It is not illegal because it is a cryptocurrency abroad that finances a Chinese company.” 

Adding to the confusion, the Digital Asset Exchange is not a private business: It is a parastatal organization run by the regional government in China’s Shanxi Province designed to help digitize Kyrgyzstan. It makes its money by charging a small commission on each cryptocurrency transaction.  

The exchange gives a perfect snapshot of the BRI’s unwieldiness for Beijing: “I came here because of the Belt and Road Initiative,” the Chinese manager said. Yet, for China, its existence is surely an unfortunate side effect that needs managing, rather than a shining star of its BRI mission.

This article was originally published by Eurasianet.

Yau Tsz Yan, Eurasianet
Yau Tsz Yan researches China in Central Asian affairs at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek.

  • Yau Tsz Yan, Eurasianet
    https://globelynews.com/author/yau-tsz-yan-eurasianet/
    China Taking Big Brother to Central Asia
Belt and Road Initiative China Connectivity Wars Featured Kyrgyzstan

More from Globely News

China-Pakistan Naval Ties Grow Amid Great Power Scramble for Indian Ocean Ports

November 20, 2023

Biden-Xi Talks Don’t Change Reality of U.S.-China Rivalry

November 17, 2023

Why Anti-Semitism is Surging in China

November 16, 2023

Russia’s Breakup: A Double-Edged Sword for China and the West

November 15, 2023

Separatist Militants Target Key Belt and Road Highway in Pakistan

November 6, 2023

China’s Middle East Balancing Act at Risk

November 4, 2023
Add A Comment

Comments are closed.

Newsletter

Subscribe to the Globely Daily

Our flagship newsletter covers the leaders, states, networks, ideologies, and technologies that are transforming world power.

Indonesia’s 2024 Presidential Election Will Be a Three-Way Race

November 29, 2023

Will COP28 Host UAE Walk the Walk on Climate Change?

November 29, 2023

What Zambia Needs to Do to Resolve Its Debt Crisis

November 28, 2023

Tesla Needs Cybertruck Success to Uphold Market Dominance

November 28, 2023
© 2023 Globely News.
  • Home
  • About
  • Editorial Policy
  • Privacy Policy
  • Terms of Use
  • Contributors
  • Write For Us
  • Contact Us

Type above and press Enter to search. Press Esc to cancel.

We use cookies on our website to give you the most relevant experience by remembering your preferences and repeat visits. By clicking “Accept”, you consent to the use of ALL the cookies.
Do not sell my personal information.
SettingsAccept
Privacy & Cookies Policy

Privacy Overview

This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website. Out of these cookies, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are as essential for the working of basic functionalities of the website. We also use third-party cookies that help us analyze and understand how you use this website. These cookies will be stored in your browser only with your consent. You also have the option to opt-out of these cookies. But opting out of some of these cookies may have an effect on your browsing experience.
Necessary
Always Enabled
Necessary cookies are absolutely essential for the website to function properly. This category only includes cookies that ensures basic functionalities and security features of the website. These cookies do not store any personal information.
SAVE & ACCEPT
Ad Blocker Enabled
Ad Blocker Enabled
Our website is made possible by displaying online advertisements to our visitors. Please support us by disabling your Ad Blocker.
Go to mobile version