On April 1, 2024, Indonesia’s president-elect, Prabowo Subianto, traveled to Beijing at the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping. Having secured the presidency on February 14, 2024, via indirect but dubious means, Prabowo wasted little time signaling his intent to cooperate with China.
While Indonesia also values its relationships with Japan and Malaysia, its relationship with China cannot be overstated. Not only does China invest heavily in Indonesian infrastructure and connectivity projects, but rising U.S.–China bipolarity and China’s continued belligerence in the South China Sea leave Indonesia in a precarious position. With three of the world’s most important chokepoints — the Malacca, Lombok, and Sumba Straits — Indonesia is arguably the most geostrategically important territory in any broader Indo-Pacific conflict.
China’s foreign policy is typically one of elite capture, meaning that Prabowo’s election victory immediately placed the former military general in Xi’s sights. The primary purpose of Xi’s invitation to Prabowo was to enquire whether he would maintain the same stance towards China as Indonesia’s incumbent president, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo.
Jokowi, whose presidency concludes in October 2024, visited China eight times in 10 years and met Xi on 12 occasions. In addition to fostering increased trade, Jokowi granted a significant number of infrastructure contracts to China. But the roots of such investment predate Jokowi himself. Between 2000 and 2017, Indonesia was China’s fourth-highest recipient of overseas direct investment, receiving $4.42 billion, and sixth-highest recipient of other official flows, receiving $29.96 billion.
As of 2021, Indonesia’s sovereign debt exposure to China was $4.95 billion, but another $17.28 billion of “hidden” public debt — debt incurred by Indonesian state-owned enterprises — was not on the government ledger. Hence, in 2021, 78 percent of Indonesia’s debt to China was not supported by a sovereign guarantee.
Prabowo should thus limit Indonesia’s growing debt exposure to China. Yet he will likely maintain the same approach to China as Jokowi.
Indonesia has no coherent China policy. Rather, it is a personality-driven relationship. And Prabowo’s presidency will likely be an extension of Jokowi’s. Indeed, Prabowo secured the presidency by running with Jokowi’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka. But Gibran was only deemed eligible to run after Indonesia’s Constitutional Court, then headed by Gibran’s uncle Anwar Usman, amended the country’s 2017 General Election Law, thereby making the 36-year-old Gibran eligible to run — the General Election Law had prescribed the minimum age of eligibility as 40 — on the contrived ground that he had already held political office.
Prabowo lost to Jokowi in 2014 and 2019 — and as late as October 2023 was not even the favorite to secure the presidency. That Prabowo won in a landslide was evidence that his own presidential legitimacy derived primarily from his newfound close association with Jokowi. Unsurprisingly, Jokowi himself has called for a “sync” between his outgoing government and the plans of the incoming Prabowo–Gibran team.
Hence, it is unlikely that Prabowo will alter course on China. This contrasts with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., whose decision to stand up to China is distinct from his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte. While Duterte’s sister Sara is Marcos’s vice president, Marcos does not enjoy a healthy relationship with her, in part due to his fractious relationship with his predecessor.
Indonesia is also already in too deep with China. It is second only to Pakistan in terms of China-funded infrastructure projects already underway, with a project value of $20.3 billion. Indonesia has the same number of projects as Pakistan, 71, second only to Cambodia’s 82.
In 2022, bilateral Indonesia–China trade reached $149.1 billion, up 19.8 percent year-on-year, and China was the second-largest source of investment in Indonesia, investing $8.2 billion. In July 2023, China pledged an additional $44.89 billion to Indonesia, and in September another $21.7 billion.
Prabowo would be foolish to think China would never leverage that debt, likely to try to compromise Indonesia’s official non-aligned position.
At the same time, Prabowo shows no signs of limiting Chinese investment. In November 2023, for example, Prabowo defended the China-financed development of the Rempang Eco-City, an industrial park that will see indigenous communities have their land acquired compulsorily for the construction of a China-owned glass and solar panel manufacturing facility. After locals demonstrated against the proposed conversion of their homes into a foreign-owned industrial park, Prabowo obfuscated, blaming the unrest on supposed meddling foreign operatives.
Third, Indonesia’s navy is tiny compared to China’s. Indonesia comprises 18,000 islands and 5 million square kilometers of water, yet its navy comprises a mere four submarines. While plans abound to more than double that fleet, Prabowo, as current Minister of Defence, is still yet to put pen to paper for the construction of submarines. While Prabowo has talked about Indonesia’s maritime sovereignty being non-negotiable, the truth is that Indonesia’s unstated approach is to do whatever it can to prevent conflict and maintain the regional status quo. It has achieved this, so far, through backroom conversations and dialogue with China.
It remains conjecture whether China actually does intend to engage in a war to “reunify” with Taiwan. China may merely want to be recognized as the regional hegemon and have continued access to the South China Sea, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea notwithstanding. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan is, according to some sources, highly unlikely. That said, rumors abound that Xi could launch a “reunification” campaign as early as 2025.
Put simply, Indonesia lacks a coherent China policy, and changes under Prabowo are highly improbable. Even if China did invade Taiwan, there is little Indonesia could do, other than calling for the cessation of conflict.
This article was originally published on the East Asia Forum.
Daniel Peterson is a lecturer in the politics of Southeast Asia at Queen’s University of London, where he researches political Islam, Indonesia, and the Indonesia–China relationship.